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My interest in prisoners of war began when I was a boy in the 1980's when I saw 
blockbuster films, such as Rambo: First Blood Part II, The Deer Hunter, Uncommon 
Valor and Missing in Action. America was caught up with the subject of our soldiers 
who were or might have been left behind as POW's and MIA's. These movies depicted 
prisoners' experience and conveyed the fear that soldiers who had done their duty as 
Americans were being punished for carrying on a war that many regretted. In some ways 
these films reflected the period of self-examination the country went through. Older 
Americans had thoughts of dishonor, betrayal, loss, and unfinished business. For me, 
then, when I watched these movies, I always asked "Why are these soldiers, unarmed and 
imprisoned, treated so harshly? Is it always this way? Do captured soldiers always get 
treated so badly for doing their job? Have they always? Are there safeguards? If there are, 
why aren't they honored?"
The object of this study is to examine the issues of prisoners of war in various conflicts 
spanning the twentieth century, the safeguards for the treatment of prisoners that have 
been set down in the various conventions, and to argue that these safeguards have failed 
to secure humane treatment for prisoners in an era of ideological warfare. There are many 
explanations for failures: the changing nature of warfare, the particular logistics and 
strategies of particular wars, and the ideological and racial conflicts of war in this 
century. In this study we can see how ideological conflicts come to overshadow and 
dominate national and ethnic hatreds for a time and the bearing that fact has on the 
treatment of the captured. We can also see how national and ethnic concerns affect the 
treatment of prisoners. There are many successes as well when one compares the 
situation of the prisoners at the end of the twentieth century with that of his peers in 
previous eras.
A definition of war is the armed conflict amongst states or nations, a conflict in which 
one's goal is to impose one's will or view upon the other. According to Clausewitz, 'the 
enemy must be disarmed' in order to achieve this goal.(1) But what happens when the 
enemy is disarmed, captured, or surrenders? In the general history of warfare, as we can 
see in the classic era and tribal warfare, a captive became a slave or form of property. 
Therefore, the prisoner was at the mercy of his captor. Frequently, a captured soldier was 
executed, as for example Alexander the Great's order that 3,000 Phokian prisoners be 
drowned.(2) 
In the Middle Ages there was an attempt to let the chivalric code determine conduct on 
the battlefield in conflicts between Christians. The Lateran Council of 1179 prohibited 
conquerors from selling or enslaving soldiers, but only in wars between Christians. 
However, the chivalric code was not unique to Christians. During the Crusades Saladin 
allowed the Knight Hospitallers of Jerusalem to care for the wounded Christians, and in 
Spain the exchange of prisoners between Moslems and Christians was frequent.(3) It was 
at this point that the execution and enslavement of soldiers declined and the prisoner's 
status evolved from slave or property into a hostage whose freedom could be ransomed. 
When King John 11 was captured at the Battle of Poitiers in 1356, his release cost France 
3,000,000 gold ecus.(4) The treatment and even the definition of what is a prisoner of war 
has differed throughout the centuries. We believe we have come a long way from the 
classical era and the Middle Ages when captured soldiers were executed, enslaved, or 
ransomed.
In the West, the middle of the seventeenth century seems to mark the moment when the 
belief that certain humanitarian rules should be observed in times of war took hold. In 
1648, the Treaty of Westphalia was perhaps the first international instrument to have laid 
down provisions for the treatment of prisoners. In Article 43, prisoners were to be freed 
by both sides 'without payment of ransom and without any exception or reservation.'(5) 
This ideal was taken up in the next century by philosophers, including two important 
Swiss, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Emmerich de Vattel. In his book The Social 
Contract, Rousseau states:
The aim of war being the destruction of the hostile State, we have a right to slay its 
defenders so long as they have arms in their hands; but as soon as they lay them down 
and surrender, ceasing to be enemies or instruments of the enemy, they become again 
simply men, and no one has any further right over their lives.(6)
And Vattel repeated:
...as soon as the adversary has been disarmed and has surrendered; no one 
any longer has any right to take his life ... it must be remembered that 
prisoners are men and unhappy ones at that.(7)
This humanitarian ideal also appeared in the Far East. In Japan the bushido was a code of 
conduct of the samurai class which taught the soldier the right and wrong way to behave. 
By the mid nineteenth century it became the basis of ethical training for the whole 
society. Bushido stressed in compassion towards the vulnerable, such as disarmed 
prisoners, and allowed honorable surrender, an ideal that would disappear during the 
Second World War.(8)
These humanitarian principles had yet to be institutionalized in the relations between the 
states. The wars of the mid-nineteenth century were bloody, both the Civil War in the 
United States, and in the wars of national unification in the German and Italian states. 
There was clearly an escalation of the destructive power of warfare as a result of 
industrialization. There was a shift from mercenary and enforced soldiery to universal or 
democratic service in which all able-bodied men might be called to war as well. In such a 
changing environment humanitarian concerns pushed the question of treatment of the 
captured to the forefront. A movement emerged which created international laws, through 
conventions and agreements, regulating the treatment of prisoner of war.
The first steps to make these humanitarian principles international took place in Geneva 
in 1862. The carnage and suffering encountered by the wounded and sick soldiers and the 
inadequate care they received on the battlefields of Europe and America was the 
motivation behind the international legislation. The battlefields which horrified Francis
Lieber, Gustave Moynier, Florence Nightingale, and made Henry Dunant write 
Souvenirs de Solferino, an account of the battle of Lombardy, also horrified the civilians 
of many nations.(9) The governments of these people were now pressured to address 
these issues, and the Genevans who had founded the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), now had the opening to make these principles international.
The US was the first government to establish formal guidelines on how its army was to 
deal with the enemy in 1863 with the "Instructions for the Government of the Armies of 
the United States in the Field." This set of instructions was written during the American 
Civil War by Francis Lieber, a German immigrant and professor of law at Columbia 
College in New York, who was influenced by the ideals of Rousseau and Vattel. It 
declared that: "A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, 
nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or 
disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death or any other 
barbarity."(10) The influence of his ideals can be seen as late as the Second World War 
where the US Army directly incorporated this code. Lieber's Code, as it became known, 
was the prototype and model for the Geneva and Hague Conventions that were to follow 
in the succeeding decades.(11)
Fundamentally the Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention dealt with different 
areas of humanitarian concern. The Hague Convention relates to the weapons and method 
of warfare; the Geneva Convention is concerned with the protection of the individual. It's 
important to realize that the Geneva Conventions are a product of the humanitarian 
efforts by such individuals as Henry Dunant, Gustave Moynier, and Lieber and 
organizations like the International Red Cross. The Hague Conventions, which deals with 
the same subject, is a convention, which has at the heart of it, the national interests of 
each participating state.(12) In the end, the motivation for both conventions is the desire 
of the contracting parties to ensure that its captured soldiers receive adequate care and 
treatment.
The work of the Genevans culminated in the "Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Soldiers Wounded in Armed Forces in the Field", but it was not truly 
international until 1882 when it was ratified by all the Great Powers and the United 
States. This Convention was responsible for establishing the International Red Cross as 
an organization responsible for the protection of wounded soldiers and the civilians who 
cared for them. At this time a Red Cross on a white background was recognized as the 
symbol of the organization. The Geneva Convention was a revolutionary piece of 
legislation, as Louis Renault, one of the founders of the Red Cross, said: 'The Geneva 
Convention was important and unique since it aimed at regularizing in a permanent 
manner a situation which, until then, had only been haphazard.'(13)
The Geneva Convention of 1864 was followed by the Brussels Declaration for the 
regulation of the Laws and Customs of War on Land. This conference was initiated by 
the Czar of Russia and its task was to prepare a treaty which would be considered by the 
attending countries. The principles were based on a Russian code on prisoners much like 
Francis Lieber's and it stated: 'Prisoners of war are not criminals but lawful enemies. 
They are in the power of the enemy government ... and should not be subjected to any 
violence or ill-usage.' If the principles of the treaty were agreed upon by all the delegates 
then it would become a convention with binding powers, if not then they would reopen 
the deliberations.(14) They did not achieve a convention at Brussels, all the delegates 
could not agree and it was not until the Hague Peace Convention in 1899 that a new 
convention was established. Specifically Article 21 of the Hague stated: 'The obligations 
of belligerents with regards to the sick and the wounded are governed by the Geneva 
Convention of August 22, 1864.' The Hague Convention was based on both the Geneva 
Convention of 1864 and the Brussels Declaration of 1874.(15) The preamble of the 
Hague Convention was a summation of the humane ideals of the conveners:
Animated by the desire to serve, even in this extreme hypothesis, the 
interests of humanity and the ever increasing requirements of civilization; 
Thinking it important, with this object, to revise the laws and general 
customs of war, either with the view of defining them more precisely, or of 
laying down certain limits for the purpose of modifying their severity as far 
as possible,... (16)
The Hague strove to attain these goals by laying down extensive rules and regulations for 
the conduct of war and in Chapter II discussed the treatment of prisoners of war. The 
prisoner should be treated in a 'manner analogous to that of the troops of the Detaining 
Power'.(17) Many articles convey this concept, such as the principle that the prisoner 
must be humanely treated, prisoners shall be treated, in regards of food, quarters, and 
clothing on the same footing as the troops of the government which captured them and 
that to declare that no quarter will be given is illegal.
Other articles dealt with the use of prisoner labor. Officers could not work, a reflection of 
the tradition that officers were gentleman born. The amount of work, which was 'not to be 
excessive', depended upon the rank and physical condition of the prisoner, and the work 
had to be non-military in nature. In articles 14 and 15, an information bureau for 
prisoners in the custody of the belligerent states, and, if necessary, in neutral states, was 
to be established. The job of the bureau was to answer all questions concerning the 
prisoner, to notify any interested parties of any changes in internment, such as transfers 
between camps or to a hospital, and to keep track of the death of prisoners. Further 
'Relief Societies', for example the Red Cross, were to be allowed to visit the prisoners in 
their place of internment to offer aid and comfort, and these societies were to be assisted 
by the belligerents in 'the effective accomplishment of their humane task.'(18)
At the time of the Hague Convention (1899), the Swiss Federal Council was asked to 
head a new conference and to revise the Wounded and Sick Convention of 1864 so that it 
could be included. By 1906 a new conference produced a new Geneva Convention in 
time to govern the treatment of the wounded and the sick during the first World War.(19) 
There were four main principles that the Convention emphasized, wounded and prisoners 
are to be taken care of, they are to be exchanged during the war and not after, they are the 
property of the detaining power, and, with the exception of officers, may be employed for 
non-military work.(20)
A second Hague Peace Conference was held and its convention ratified in 1907. There 
were few revisions to the original Hague Convention of 1899, except that it took a step 
back by not removing the 'general participation clause'. According to Article 2 of the 
Hague Convention: "The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1, 
as well as in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers, 
and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.(21) In effect this clause 
only made the Convention binding in case of war between two belligerent states who had 
agreed to the convention and ceased to have effect if any 'nonContracting' party became a 
belligerent. This clause was detrimental to the convention because it could be, and later 
on would be, used as an excuse for the maltreatment of prisoners. Many countries had not 
ratified the convention and were, therefore, not bound to follow the guidelines. It 
indicates that the framers were unaware that the future nature of warfare would involve 
not just two nations but alliances of many nations and that not all belligerents would be 
parties to the convention.
The First World War severely tested the Hague Convention of 1907, the rules and 
regulations of which were written only seven years before the outbreak of the war. The 
framers could not predict that warfare, as it was known to them, would change so 
drastically in such a short period of time. Europe had not witnessed a general war since 
1815, but instead short, decisive, and not very bloody conflicts such as the Austro-
Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. These two national wars did 
not resemble the American Civil War, in which over four million men were mobilized 
and staggering casualties and tens of thousands of prisoners were taken. Neither did they 
resemble the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 in which the Russian surrender at Port 
Arthur yielded over 24,000 prisoners to the Japanese. But the experiences of the 
American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War fell on deaf ears; they were'not much 
appreciated in Europe.(22) These wars ought to have indicated to the nations of the world 
that modem warfare was going to be different, but the Geneva Convention remained the 
same on the eve of the First World War.
The twentieth century has often been described as the century of 'total war'. With the 
introduction of the Industrial Revolution to the battlefield many of the traditional 
restraints on warfare were broken. Nations mobilized their industries to produce such 
technological innovations like the machine gun, which had proved its effectiveness in the 
Russo-Japanese War, poison gas, and barbed wire, all of which made the war on the 
western front stagnate. "Strategists perceived a devastating contradiction between their 
initial dreams of a brief, glorious, and inexpensive victory and their soldiers' desperate 
attempts to win a few yards of blood soaked ground at tremendous cost." (23) New 
weapons, such as submarines and Zeppelins, were used to attack civilian targets. As a 
result of the increasing demands by the military in terms of food, clothing, and war 
materiel for the front, the civilians at home became directly involved in the war effort, 
therefore the distinction between combatant and non-combatant was lost. Michael 
Howard put aptly when he said that the First World War was: 'a conflict, not of armies 
but of populations.' By extending the boundaries of war, and with the increasing 
evolution of two distinct but equally important fronts, the Home Front and the Battlefield, 
the First World War became a true unification of war and 'civil society'.(24) This 
confusion of the Home Front and the Battlefield made it harder to treat prisoners 
humanely as there was no longer any place free from the threats and pressures of 
violence.
A result of the total war was the largest scale mobilization of soldiers in history, which in 
turn meant the greatest number of prisoners captured and imprisoned. Within the first six 
months of the war there were already over 1.3 million prisoners in Europe.(25) During 
the Battle of Tannenburg, on the Eastern front, the Russian Army surrendered by the 
thousands:
Eventually, they came towards us with a very large white flag, the Russian 
officer telling their men to throw away their arms,... We took 20,000 
prisoners...The hundreds of officers were rounded up in two farmhouses, 
while the men desperately hungry, were put in fields where they had to stay 
for several days.(26)
By the end of that campaign there were over 92,000 Russian prisoners. Just to find 
housing was a mammoth problem. Besides housing there were other logistical problems 
such as food and clothing. The examples of mass surrender were not only common on the 
Eastern front but also in the Arabian Peninsula, 'In British hands were 75,000 Turkish 
prisoners', all captured between September 19 and October 26, 1916.(27)
Many officials overlooked the amount of logistical support modem warfare required. 
Many nations had enormous difficulty maintaining their armies in the field, never mind 
the prisoners they captured. This was especially true of Russia. It's important to realize 
that the Russian Army's logistical capabilities were stretched to the limits. Russia's 
dependence on the Allies, for the import of war materiel and export of wheat, was crucial 
if it was going to continue fighting.
Many men have no boots, and their legs are frostbitten. They have no 
sheepskin or warm underwear, and are catching colds. The result is that in 
regiments which have lost their officers mass surrenders to the enemy have 
been developing, sometimes on the initiative of wartime officers. 'Why 
should we die from hunger and exposure, without boots? The artillery keeps 
silent, and we are shot down like partridges. One is better off in 
Germany.'(28)
This dependence led to the gradual collapse of the country.(29) It could not conduct a 
successful offensive or defensive campaign let alone run a system of prison camps. 
Russia had in custody over 300,000 of the 1.3 million men captured within the first six 
months of the war. The condition in Russian prisoner camps were nowhere near the 
minimum the Geneva Convention called for. The camps were overcrowded and clothing 
and housing were poor. Most German prisoners were sent to Siberia where the ratio of 
guards to prisoners was I to 100 while west of the Urals the ratio was 10 to 100. This 
allowed the Russian Army to keep a greater number of soldiers on their western front. 
But there was also a political reason for this transfer of prisoners to Siberia. As part of 
their Pan-Slavism the Russians intended often to exploit the ethnic differences among the 
prisoners favoring Slavs over Germans. In the end approximately 17 to 25 percent of the 
prisoners in Russian hands died, roughly 5 times the death rate in German prison 
camps.(30)
In 1917, with the outbreak of civil war, the Russian Army lost its ability to administer its 
camps. When Revolution, nationalism, and total warfare had become inseparable the 
prisoner of war became a potential soldier both in propaganda and armed conflict. During 
the Revolution the Bolsheviks tried to recruit prisoners to fight against the white armies. 
The prisoner was seen as someone who could fight or be repatriated to sow dissension or 
rebellion at home. Such practices that we refer to as 'brainwashing' and 'indoctrination' in 
the latter half of the twentieth century had their beginnings among the prisoners in 
Russian camps. Just as nationalists had mobilized ethnic hatreds, at the beginning of the 
war through Pan-Slavism, an ideological struggle was born in the prisoner camps of the 
Bolsheviks. The treatment of Russia's prisoners was affected the most by the 
circumstances of the country. The various factors that contributed to the poor treatment of 
the prisoners was the climate, the logistical shortcomings of the army, which induced 
battlefield reverses, and most importantly social upheaval in the form of the Bolshevik 
Revolution.(31)
The German army did its best to adhere to the Geneva Conventions and to care for the 
prisoners in a humane and proper manner. Their camps provided barracks, bathhouses, 
clinics, and prison kitchens but prisoners still suffered from overcrowding and 
malnutrition. The latter was partly a consequence of the naval blockade imposed by the 
Allies. One German practice that was widely criticized was the mixing of prisoners of 
different nationalities in one camp, but there were exceptions. Irish prisoners were housed 
at a camp in Limburg and Hindu and Islamic prisoners were housed at Zossen. This was a 
calculated attempt to exploit the ethnicity of the prisoners for military and political 
advantages and was aimed at disrupting the forces of Great Britain, a tactic similar to 
Russia's. The prisoners that seemed to suffer the most were Russian. According to a 
British officer: "It was no unusual sight to see a crowd of Russians on their hands and 
knees in the pit in which potato peelings were thrown, struggling to find a stray potato or 
a piece of rind with a little more potato than usual."(32) The method, by both the 
Russians and Germans, to isolate different ethnic groups and to single out others for 
maltreatment during the Second World War has its origins here.
The British had little trouble with the housing of their prisoners because compared to the 
other belligerents they had so few, only 150,000 by February 1915. The prisoners were 
housed in camps in France, Great Britain and aboard ships, nine holding 11,000. British 
camps were adequate and there was little of the hunger, malnutrition, and diseases which 
plagued the camps of the other belligerents.(33) The prisoners were used for labor and 
most were engaged in agricultural work. By end of the war there were 67,000 prisoners at 
work in Britain. The work week ran from Monday to Saturday, except during the harvest 
season which included Sundays, and they labored for the same number of hours as local 
workers. These same work conditions applied to the camps under British authority in 
France. The success of the British camp system can be attributed to two reasons; one, 
they believed and followed the rules and regulations laid down by the Geneva 
Convention and two, they captured a small number of prisoners, 165,000 during the war.
By 1914 Germany had many colonies in the Pacific, Tsingtao, on the southeast coast of 
China's Shantung Peninsula, was a major reason for Japan's involvement in the war.(34) 
German prisoners from Tsingtao were confused by the treatment they received at the 
hands of the Japanese. The people were very friendly to them; "The Japanese Emperor 
also dispatched [to the port] an officer as his official representative to welcome the 
prisoners."(35) But the internment camps were not adequate, dating back to the Russo-
Japanese war, of eight to ten years before. In Camp Kurume, for example, the 
combination of poor housing, overcrowding, and lack of food created tension between 
prisoners and guards.
During the First World War there were massacres of prisoners, particularly reprisals as 
was common in the Arabian desert. On September 27, at the village of Tafas, Turkish and 
German forces murdered hundreds of women and children. As they retreated to 
Damascus they were attacked by a force of Arabs whose leader, T.E. Lawrence, gave 
orders that no prisoners were to be taken, 'The best of you bring me the most Turkish 
dead'. In his own words he wrote: 'the rich plain was scattered over with dead men and 
animals. In a madness born of the horror of Tafas we killed and killed even blowing in 
the heads of the fallen and of the animals.'(36)
On the following day at Dera'a Bedouin and Arab forces murdered Turkish wounded and 
prisoners. The British 4th Calvary Division reported: 'Arabs murdered in cold blood 
every Turk they came cross.' The atrocity of Tafas was used as an excuse for the murder 
of these Turkish prisoners. As the war dragged on, according to Liddell Hart: 'The 
decline of civilized behavior became steeper ... there was an appalling growth of brutality 
towards wounded and prisoners.'(37) Various nations broke the laws which they had 
written only a few years earlier. 
The Geneva Convention of 1906 and the Hague Convention of 1907 proved inadequate 
in their first 'field test' and they were revised in the Geneva Convention of 1929. The 
effects of total war showed that if a nation is not prepared, logistically, it becomes 
difficult, almost impossible, to treat prisoners decently and humanely as soon as their 
numbers start to get into the hundreds of thousands. The collapse and breakdown of many 
countries during the wax contributed to the mistreatment of the prisoners. Add to this the 
beginnings of ideological struggles and emergence of nationalism, then the prisoner of 
war is placed in a situation which leaves him powerless.
The decades between the First World War and the Second World War witnessed the 
movement from the Wilsonian spirit to fascism. In the eyes of President Wilson the First 
World War was 'a war to end all wars' and to 'make the world safe for democracy'; 
through international cooperation wars would be a thing of the past, hence the League of 
Nations. The 'Era of Good Feeling' came to an end with the Great Crash of 1929 and the 
rise of fascism in Europe. Nevertheless the problems posed by the war were deemed 
important enough to the nations of the world that they found it necessary to expand on the 
previous guidelines.
The League of Nations was instrumental in the drafting and completion of the Geneva 
Convention of 1929, which was written in the light of the experience of the First World 
War. A major revision in this Convention was the removal of the 'general participation 
clause' which could be found in the previous two Conventions. This clause was a 'fatal 
flaw' because it meant that the rules and regulations governing the treatment of prisoners 
had not been applicable as law. The clause rendered the Convention void because not all 
the belligerents; Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire, were 
signatories of the Convention. Consequently Germany used this clause to its advantage, 
because it did not regard the Convention as binding they could not be held responsible for 
any infractions they may have committed.(38)
Another important area were the practice of reprisals. Following the large scale use of 
reprisals against prisoners during the war, for example at Dera'a, this practice was 
categorically forbidden by Article 2 of the 1929 Convention, which is, in essence, a 
repetition of Article 4 of the 1907 Convention: "They must at all times be humanely 
treated and protected particularly against acts of violence, insult, and public curiosity. 
Measures of reprisals against them are prohibited.(39) The Convention was much more 
detailed in an attempt to establish rules and guidelines which would cover all aspects of 
the life of a prisoner. Articles 1 through 7 covered the general rules pertaining to 
prisoners. This section also stated that the prisoner must be evacuated from the area of 
their capture, or the site of danger in the shortest amount of time. Furthermore, it 
specified that the prisoner was not to walk on foot for longer than 20 kilometers a day, 
unless he could not reach food and water within that distance.
Unlike the previous Conventions, the Convention of 1929 was also much more specific 
with regard to the internment of prisoners. Articles 9 through 18 covered the camp and its 
facilities which contrasts with the single article, number 7, of the 1907 Hague 
Convention. Prisoners were to be interned in a closed camp, they were to be accorded 
facilities for the preparation of additional foods, and disciplinary actions affecting food 
were not allowed. Article 11 reiterated the concept that the food supplied to the prisoner 
be equivalent to the food supplied to the depot soldier. The camp was obligated to 
maintain sanitary measures to prevent the spread of epidemics, which included supplying 
water for baths and showers.
The use of prisoner labor was also regulated in articles 30 through 32. The length of the 
workday was not to exceed that of the civilians of the area, and they were to have 24 
hours of continuous rest, for example Sunday. The labor performed should have no direct 
relation to war operations, and it was forbidden to use prisoners for the manufacture of 
arms or munitions.
The Geneva Convention of 1929 also allowed the prisoners to assign a representative, 
usually the highest ranking officer, to make any complaints and recommendations to the 
Detaining Power and the Relief Societies. In addition disciplinary punishments and 
judicial processes were covered. Under the heading 'Disciplinary Punishment' the 
prisoner was subjected to the laws, regulations, and orders of the Detaining Power. It 
forbade the use of corporal punishment, isolation of a prisoner from his comrades or 
daylight, collective punishment for the actions of an individual prisoner, and in general 
any form of cruelty. The Detaining Power had the responsibility of informing the 
Protecting Power of the opening date of a trial for a prisoner, and that the sentence be 
immediately reported to them. If the sentence was the death penalty, then a detailed 
report concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense was to be forwarded to the 
Protecting Power and any Interested Power, these regulations lay under the title 'Judicial 
Punishment'. The idea of a prisoner information bureau was reiterated in Article 77, and 
it retained its purpose which was originally put forth in the Hague Convention of 
1899.(40) Most, or all of these regulations would be violated to one degree or other due 
to the increasing militarism before and during the Second World War.
The dominant political trends of the 1930's were the rise of fascism, in Italy, Germany, 
Portugal and Japan, and the polarization between the Left and the Right. The world could 
no longer look at the First World War as the 'war to end all wars', there was now a 
division of Europe into 'three opposing ideologies, fascism, democracy and 
communism.(41) The Spanish Civil War of 1936? provided a glimpse of the ideological 
confrontation which would play such an important role in the treatment of prisoners 
during the Second World War. It was the war in which the ideological confrontation 
between fascism and communism, through the Nationalists and the Republicans, with 
support from fascist Germany and Italy and communist Soviet Union, first occurred. In 
this sense the Spanish Civil War was an international civil war, an aspect that would 
come to define the later conflicts of the twentieth century, especially Korea and Vietnam.
The destructiveness of the men imbued with these ideals, fascists and communists, can be 
attributed to what Paul Fussell calls the 'versus habit', which was an outcome of the First 
World War:
...a model of modem political, social, artistic, and psychological polarization 
... what we can call the modem versus habit: one thing opposed to another, 
not with some Hegelian hope of synthesis involving a dissolution of both 
extremes ... but with a sense that one of the poles embodies so wicked a 
deficiency or flaw or perversion that its total submission is called for.(42)
The ideological and racial objectives of the belligerents in the Second World War would 
exhibit this behavior and it would be evident in the treatment of prisoners. While the 
Republicans and the Nationalists fought, Germany annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
and Japan was pursuing its imperial objectives in the Pacific. Five months after the end of 
the Spanish Civil War the world would once again be engulfed by the flames of war.
The Second World War brought death, destruction, and suffering on a scale never 
witnessed before in history and the prisoner was part of that. During the war some thirty 
five million prisoners were taken worldwide. For all its logic and humanitarian values the 
Geneva Convention was only a collection of guidelines written ten years earlier, and 
many of the problems that were theoretical in 1929 became a reality in 1939. (43) The 
ideological differences born out of this decade would be the major factor in the treatment 
of prisoners. The treatment of the prisoners also varied greatly between the Pacific and 
the European theaters of operation. In the Pacific theater racism played an important role 
and it epitomizes the extremity to which the maltreatment of prisoners can reach. The 
same could be said for the treatment which Soviet prisoners encountered at the hands of 
the Germans in eastern Europe. In the European theater, the treatment which a prisoner 
was subjected to depended on whether he was captured in the western theater, including 
North Africa, or captured in the eastern theater. The one characteristic that the Pacific 
theater and the eastern European theater had in common was that the treatment of 
prisoners was dictated by racism.
The Bataan Death March stands out as the classic case of the mistreatment of prisoners in 
the Pacific theater, which is notorious for the atrocities perpetrated by the Japanese 
during the war. This is in stark contrast to the way the Japanese treated prisoners during 
the Russo-Japanese War and to some extent the First World War. Article 7 of the 
Portsmouth Treaty, which ended the Russo-Japanese War, states: 'The Japanese army 
will, in honor of the gallant defense made by the Russians, allow the Russian military and 
naval officers to wear swords.' (44) In contrast to the Second World War when the 
Japanese would strip their prisoners of all their possessions, and these sword vestiges of 
feudal military codes would disappear.
When 70,000 American and Filipino soldiers surrendered to the Japanese, on April 9, 
1942, they were already close to starvation. They were marched fifty-five miles to San 
Fernando virtually without food or water. On the road Japanese soldiers heading south 
would strike at the prisoners as they headed north with: 'rifle butts, bayonets, lengths of 
bamboo, looted golf clubs, anything.' They beheaded prisoners for having water stains on 
their trousers. Prisoners were fed watery rice, one five gallon can per hundred men, 
which averaged out to 'five ounces of slop per man.'(45) Herded onto trains which came 
in two shapes and sizes, one, made out of wood with a low ceiling, the Japanese fit fifty 
prisoners; the other was a forty and eight, from the First World War, which were meant 
for forty soldiers or eight horses. The Japanese fit a hundred men into these. Men died of 
heat strokes and dehydration: 'Men died standing up with no room to fall, and the others 
cursed them for not dying at a stop so they could be thrown out to make more room.'(46) 
The outcome of this 100 mile, two week experience was the death of 16,000 prisoners.
The camp commandant, Captain Tsuneyoshi Yoshio, greeted them with his view of the 
world. The domination of the 'white man' in Asia was over, and the prisoners were the 
eternal enemies of Japan due to their inferior race. The camp, originally built for 8,000 
Filipino soldiers, would eventually house over 50,000 American and Filipino prisoners. 
The conditions at the camp were horrendous. There was a shortage of water and what 
little they had was filthy. The food was usually lugao, rice gruel, and perhaps, though 
infrequently, some meat or camote, sweet potato. There was also a lack of medical 
supplies, the medics had next to nothing to combat malaria, dysentery, and other diseases 
common to the jungle.(47) When the Filipino Red Cross tried to deliver food or 
medicine, as was granted by the Geneva Convention, they were not allowed to unload. 
Captain Yoshio regarded relief society aid as a violation of 'regulations'.
When it came to the treatment of Asian prisoners the Japanese were just as cruel and 
barbaric. After the surrender at Bataan Japanese soldiers were halting men from the 91st 
Filipino Division and tying their hands together with telephone wire. On the third day 
they were all escorted to a ravine near the Pantingan River. Once there a Japanese officer 
stated: "Dear friends, pardon us. If you surrendered early, we will not kill you. But we 
suffered heavy casualties, so just pardon us. If you have any last wish before we kill you 
just tell us." The Japanese proceeded to bayonet and behead the prisoners. On a separate 
occasion at a hospital the Filipino sick and wounded were led to believe that they were 
free to go: 'They took off [Filipinos], thousands of them crutches and all, branches of 
trees if they had no crutches.' the Japanese went after them and killed them all.(48)
The Japanese also conducted medical experiments on prisoners, whether they were 
American, British, Dutch, or Asian. At Shinagawai the head doctor conducted operations 
no western doctor would have approved, with the exception of Nazi doctors. 
Furthermore, they gave injections of caprylic acid, soybean extract, sulfur, castor oil, 
serum from malaria sufferers, and urine. At Khandok a prisoner was used as a live 
specimen for the benefit of Japanese medical students. He was tied to a tree, his 
fingernails torn out, his body cut open, and his heart cut out; a medical student 
commented, 'For the first time I saw the internal organs of a human being. It was very 
informative.'(49)
These actions violated not only international laws but the regulations issued to the 
Japanese Army. Army Instruction No.22, issued in 1904 and entitled 'Japanese Army 
Regulations for the Handling of Prisoners of War' states: '[that all] prisoners of war will 
be treated with a spirit of goodwill and shall never be subjected to cruelties or 
humiliations.'(50) From the beginning of the war the Japanese government issued an all 
purpose statement to cover up their treatment of prisoners. The statement read: "In the 
general spirit of bushido all captives are being accorded the best possible treatment, and 
they [prisoners] were unanimously expressing appreciation of Japanese 
magnanimity."(51) From that point forward the Japanese government insisted that abuses 
were 'non existent' or that allegations were being 'investigated'.
Of course the atrocities during the war were not one sided. On the allied side of the war, 
from beginning to end, among the soldiers, there was as a reluctance to take prisoners. 
There were relatively few prisoners taken by Allied forces. There were cases when 
American bomber pilots and submarine commanders would machine-gun the survivors of 
a sunk ship. American soldiers would take Japanese ears, boil heads and sometimes send 
the skulls back home. In the May 22, 1945 issue of Life there was a picture of an 'All-
American' girl holding the skull of a Japanese soldier that her fiance had sent her. 
Marines and soldiers often felt that a 'well washed Japanese skull' was a symbol of 
invincibility. After securing the island of Saipan, Seabees were cruising around in boats 
decorated with Japanese skulls 'skewered on stakes like shish kebabs.(52) There are also 
examples of Americans taking the gold teeth from Japanese prisoners, as E.B. Sledge 
wrote in With the Old Breed;
The Japanese's mouth glowed with huge gold-crowned teeth, and his captor 
wanted them ... He put the point of his Kabar [knife] on the base of a tooth 
and hit the handle with the palm of his hand ... Another Marine ran up, put a 
bullet in the enemy soldiers brain and ended his agony [the prisoner was still 
alive]. The scavenger grumbled and continued extracting his prizes 
undisturbed.(53)
Australian soldiers were also known to gouge the gold teeth out of prisoners.
After Guadalcanal it was common to treat surrendering Japanese soldiers as rifle targets. 
following is an account of how American soldiers "flushed" a Japanese soldier out of 
hiding and amused themselves by shooting at him:
The soldiers found his movements uproariously funny and were prevented 
by their laughter from making an early end of the unfortunate man. Finally, 
however, they succeeded in killing him, and the incident cheered the whole 
platoon, giving them something to talk and joke about for days afterward.
In one particular case, the Sittang River flooded and as Japanese soldiers were swept 
downstream British soldiers opened fire with their machine guns.(54)
Allied commanders in charge of prisoner camps tried to treat the Japanese within the 
humanitarian guidelines laid down by the Geneva Convention of 1929, but supply 
problems led to a shortage of rations in some camps and none of the camps were immune 
to the diseases of the jungle. General Numata, reporting in 1946 on the 'condition of 
Japanese personnel in Southern regions', noted that 20 percent of the 59,000 prisoners at 
Rempang were infected with malaria, dysentery, or beri-beri.(55) At other camps the 
Japanese prisoners revolted, at Featherston camp in 1943 and Cowra in 1944. At 
Featherston several hundred prisoners with stones and makeshift weapons attacked their 
guards. At Cowra over 900 prisoners stormed the barbed wire perimeter which resulted in 
248 dead prisoners and over 100 wounded prisoners.(56)
The actions by Japanese soldiers was dictated by their belief of 'kill or be killed'. In a 
report, dated June 1945, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) noted that 84 percent 
of a group of interrogated Japanese prisoners stated that they expected to be killed or 
tortured in retaliation for the treatment that the Allied prisoners had received. For 
example, on the island of Saipan 30,000 Japanese soldiers preferred death to capture, 
only 921 prisoners were taken. In addition to these casualties an additional 4,000 civilians 
committed suicide.(57) The OWI analysts described this as typical concluding that fear of 
the consequences of surrender, as well as the bushido code, was the motivation for many 
Japanese soldiers to fight to their deaths. This fear was not totally unfounded as word of 
the Allied soldiers taste for 'souvenirs' spread.
The war between the United States and Japan was not only a war for control of the 
Pacific, but one of culture and especially race. The Japanese attitude toward the prisoner 
was different than that of the Western nations, and in turn the United States attitudes 
toward Japanese prisoners differed from that of their other prisoners. Prisoners from all 
the armies were starved denied medical treatment, and forced to perform hard labor, all of 
which where violations of the Geneva Convention. As John Dower states: 'Race hate fed 
atrocities and atrocities in turn fanned the fires of race hate.'(58) This race war was 
brutally waged by both sides. This ideology that the Japanese race was the superior race 
of Asia is evident in the speeches of Captain Yoshio. Paul Fussell also takes this point of 
view in Thank God for the Atom Bomb. The Japanese soldier was able to rationalize 
the mistreatment of the prisoners since the 'white man was dishonorable and worthless', 
with the idea that the Japanese race was superior.(59) The race war was also fueled by 
propaganda, especially in the United States. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese 
were seen as dishonorable. During the war the Japanese were often depicted as 'apes' or 
'monkeys' and referred to as 'slant eyes.'(60)
Another reason for this race war was the idea of 'Pan-Asianism'. The Japanese military 
elected to establish, through force, a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere', which was 
not much different from Nazi Germany's idea of Lebensraum. It was to be an industrial 
and economic bloc with the ability to compete with the world powers. As the self-
appointed leaders of the CoProsperity Sphere, Japan would dominate the political scene, 
take over the local economies, and impose broad programs of 'Japanization'. In 1942 the 
government prepared a secret study which was entitled 'Global Policy with the Yamato 
[Japanese] Race as the Nucleus.' The purpose of this study was not to advance the 
interests of the 'Asians' but of Japan, in the end the slogan Asia for the Asians became 
Asia for Japan.(61)
The Japanese believed that there were recent attempts by the United States and European 
nations to weaken them. During the Versailles Treaty, in 1919, they were not allowed to 
retain the colonies that they had won in the war, colonies that had once belonged to 
Germany. At the Washington Naval Conference, in 1922, the ratio of American and 
British ships to Japanese ships was established at 5 to 3.(62) An insult to an island nation 
who had come to depend on its navy before and during the war. To the United States and 
Europe, especially Great Britain, 'Pan-Asianism' was a threat to their control of the 
colonies in the Far East, especially since Japan had decided to take up the mantle of 'Asia 
for the Asians'.
It's important to analyze the influence of bushido on the Japanese Army and its role in the 
treatment of prisoners. During the Second World War the code of the mid-nineteenth 
century, which was honorable and just, was misinterpreted, anything with concern to 
respect for the enemy, or mercy, or restraint seems to have been ignored. This began in 
1904 when a new set of service regulations was issued which placed extraordinary 
importance on 'military spirit', and explicitly held the bushido as a model.(63) The soldier 
held a view that death meant honor, and surrender meant dishonor, a belief that led them 
too have total contempt for prisoners.
The bushido was used as an explanation for the mistreatment of prisoners. The best 
example of this is the ultimatum issued by the Japanese General Homma to the American 
and Filipino forces on Bataan. He issued the ultimatum with the humanitarian principles 
of bushido in mind.(64) If they surrendered by March 22 they would be treated fairly and 
according to international law, the Geneva Convention. Allied forces did not surrender 
until April 9, they had not accepted what General Homma called an 'honorable defeat', 
and in the process dishonored the bushido. Therefore, the Japanese soldier did not have to 
treat the prisoners in accordance with the Convention resulting in the Bataan Death 
March.
Bushido meant whatever the officers wanted it to mean. There were those officers, such 
as Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, who wanted all prisoners killed. These officers 
were usually from the 'China Gang', veterans of the Nanking Massacre. There were 
others, like Rear Admiral Sadamichi who saved the lives of 1,600 American prisoners on 
Wake Island on December 23, 1942 by ordering the officer in charge to not execute the 
prisoners. He believed that killing prisoners was a violation of bushido. Another officer 
who believed this was General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. He refused to kill Filipino officials 
on he island of Cebu, He had worked in a prisoner camp during the First World War and 
was proud of the humanitarian treatment given to German prisoners, in his own words he 
said: 'To shoot defeated opponents in cold blood [is] a violation of the true bushido.' But 
these examples are few and far in between, and at the end of the war the International 
Tribunal for the Far East was severe in its condemnation of the bushido as a major factor 
in atrocities.(65)
In Europe the Germans generally respected the rights of American, British, and French 
prisoners, but they treated the Soviet and Slav prisoners brutally. With regard to the 
prisoner on the Eastern front the treatment, by both Germany and the U.S.S.R., was 
clearly criminal and caused millions of deaths. Its important to realize that this racial and 
ideological hatred would surpass the boundaries of war and also include the civilians of 
eastern Europe, especially Jews.
The operations of the mobile killing groups, Einsatzgruppen, under the command of 
Reinhard Heydrich, were instrumental in the elimination of the Red Army Political 
Commissars. Under the 'Commissar Order', they [commissars] were not to be treated as 
prisoners of war but be shot on the spot.(66) These groups worked right behind the 
advancing army, and in many cases worked in close co-operation with the army. There 
were also orders to execute guerillas and any civilians suspected of helping them. If the 
guerillas could not be found than collective measures were to be taken against the civilian 
population.(67) For the millions who survived the offensive and the Einsatzgruppen there 
was still the matter of the prisoner camps.
The German Army had made no specific arrangements for transporting, feeding, and 
clothing the large number of prisoners they were going to capture in its blitzkrieg
offensive. The Soviet prisoner was not allowed to ride on trains or trucks returning to the 
rear, in the direction of the camps, out of a racist fear that they would contaminate the 
vehicles with 'lice and vermin'.(68) Many died of exposure because they marched 
unprotected against the elements, their clothes having been confiscated by German front 
line troops. Thousands more died from lack of food, and many more died because they 
were falling behind and the Germans had orders to shoot them. During the Nuremberg 
Trials one witness said: "The greater number of prisoners remained in the theater of 
operations, without proper care... Many of them died on the bare ground. Epidemics 
broke out and cannibalism manifested itself." When they reached the camps the camp 
commanders complained that: 'from five to ten percent of the prisoners arrived either 
dead or half-dead.'(69)
According to General Reinecke, the Soviets were different from other combatants and 
should be treated differently. It was suggested that the camp guards carry whips and 
should have the authority to shoot prisoners when necessary. Once at the camps 
conditions did not improve, at one of the camps the hungry prisoners were thrown a dead 
dog: '...there followed a spectacle that could make a man puke. Yelling like mad, the 
Russians would fall on the animal and tear it to pieces with their bare hands... The 
intestines they'd stuff in their pockets.' At another camp, near Rovno, a Hungarian tank 
officer witnessed a similar situation: 'I went to have a look. Behind wire there were tens 
of thousands of Russian prisoners [80,000]. Hundreds were dying every day, and those 
who had any strength left dumped them in a vast pit.(70) In the concentration camp of 
Sauchsenhausen alone, some 60,000 Soviet prisoners of war died of hunger, neglect, 
torture, and shooting in the winter of 1941-1942.(71)
At other camps the prisoners were used for medical experiments. At Auschwitz the first 
successful use of Zyklon B was on Soviet prisoners of war, this method of killing would 
be later implemented to the 'Jewish question'. At Dachau, the prisoners of war were 
subjected to a number of 'immersion' tests into ice cold water. This experiment was to test 
the survivability of downed pilots in extremely cold waters, none survived.(72)
Prisoner labor became very important to the leaders of the Third Reich as the war 
dragged on. Short and decisive victories were necessary if Germany was to accomplish 
its goals but the tactic of blitzkrieg, or lightning war, did not work as Germany was not 
able to defeat the Soviet Union. The German economy was not geared toward the war of 
attrition which it now faced at the end of 1942. As the war progressed it became clear that 
German industry could not keep up with the numbers of armaments and supplies which 
the Allies produced. In fact when the United States joined the Allies in 1941 Germany 
faced an enemy which outproduced them by 300 percent. Since a large portion of men 
were drafted into the German army it meant that workers in agriculture and industry 
would have to be replaced. By 1940 there were 300,000 Polish prisoners working in 
agriculture while French prisoners were filling the labor deficits of the industrial arena. 
By October 1940 there were 1.2 million French prisoners working in the Reich. At first 
the thought that a Soviet prisoner could replace a German worker was inconceivable. The 
racist attitude that they were subhumans persisted, but as the war dragged on it became 
obvious that the Soviet prisoners were needed to fill in the gaps of the labor shortage.(73)
At this point the Soviet prisoner was used for labor and their rations depended on their 
ability to work. Those that could work received 15,400 calories per week (cal/wk), and 
those that were involved in any 'work worth mentioning' 14,200 cal/wk. The rations of 
the latter groups were reduced to 10,407 cal/wk in October 1941, the same month as the 
von Richenau. order. This was in direct violation of the Geneva Convention which 
required that the prisoners receive rations equal to those of the depot soldiers. The depot 
soldier in Germany received 24,203 cal/wk, a difference that ranged between 9,000 and 
14,000 cal/wk. In a speech by Heinrich Himmler:
The attacking forces [German army] cut their way through. The Russian 
army was herded together in great pockets, ground down, taken prisoner ... 
the mass of humanity as we value it today [in the form of labor] ... it is 
deplorable [that they were not saved] ... the prisoners died in tens and 
hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger."(74)
The Soviet Union made an effort to follow international laws even though the 
mistreatment of prisoners was common. The flood of German prisoners began in the 
winter of 1941-1942, after the counter-offensive on the Moscow front which resulted in 
115,634 prisoners. Many of the prisoners did not reach the camps as those that fell behind 
were shot. The harsh Russian winter also took its share of the prisoners. The lack of food 
made some wander into the fields and they too were shot. After the battle of Stalingrad in 
1942, when the German army had surrendered, Stalin had the 57,000 prisoners, with 
several generals and dozens of officers at their head, marched through the streets of 
Moscow.(75) Of the 10,000 prisoners in one of the camps near Kiev 8,000 died in the 
span of two months, a mortality rate of 80 percent.(76)
Their policy concerning prisoners was similar to the one implemented by the Germans 
when it came to labor. Production was more important than humane treatment. A prisoner 
might literally work himself to death. Many of the German prisoners volunteered for 
heavy quarry work because he had heard that they got more to eat. The prisoners were 
underfed and often reduced to 'eating rats and drinking melted snow.' What little food 
they were given was usually rotten, spoiled food. This was because the camp 
commanders would accept the spoiled food and let the suppliers sell the good food on the 
black market. Not unlike the Germans the Soviets linked work quotas to rations, the less 
produced, the less food.(77)
The Soviets had a 're-education' and 'de-Nazification' program in which they would first 
'dehumanize' the prisoner and then 'remold' him through work. The first step was to make 
the German soldier feel as if he were alone: "First shock: the collapse of order in which 
one had previously believed and thought to be soundly constructed ... Men ... suddenly 
revealed themselves as merely human, people for whom "I" was more important than the 
idea of sticking together."(78) The National Socialist Party emphasized the importance of 
the state, not the individual. It was essential to strip the German soldier of this identity, to 
make him believe that the 'Reich' had deserted him. The second aspect of the 're-
education' program was hard labor. According to Red Army Colonel Osipenko, head of 
the Political Education Program: 'There is no better educator than work, hard physical 
work. It purifies a man's body and mind.' In a propaganda article , entitled "Captured 
into Freedom", the Soviets declared: "The prisoner has learned to see. Under the Nazi 
uniform a beast has slowly evolved back into a human being. In Russia he [prisoner] 
begins to realize that he is not something 'higher'."(79)
The Soviets first tried this program on Polish prisoners. After the annexation of Eastern 
Poland in 1939 the Soviets tried to select and train men for a Polish 'Red Army' from 
captured officers. Of the 8,500 candidates only 20 officers were successfully 
indoctrinated. During the marches, in 1939, the Polish prisoners were given a kilo of 
bread, one salt fish, and no water. A Lieutenant Solczynski described his march:
I suffered terribly from thirst. I put a piece of bread in my mouth and started to munch it, 
but a quarter of an hour passed before I could swallow it, so dry was my throat ... After 
marching without rest from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., we were again halted. We remained 
without shelter and crowded together without food or drink, until six o'clock the next 
morning.
Of the 2,000 men who accompanied Lieutenant Solczynski only 550 survived. Execution 
of Polish prisoners also occurred, such as the Katyn Forest Massacre, or the 7,000 
prisoners who were placed aboard barges and towed out into the White Sea and 
abandoned.(80)
A major factor behind the atrocities committed by both the Soviet and German armies 
was ideology. The war against the Soviet Union was described by Adolf Hitler as a 
'Weltanschauunskrieg':
[A] struggle between Weltanschauungen [ideologies] ... it is a war of 
extermination... The struggle will be very different from that in the west. In 
the east toughness now means mildness in the future. The leaders [German 
generals] must make sacrifices and overcome their scruples.(81)
Omer Bartov's book, The Eastern Front 1941-1945: German Troops and the 
Barbarisation of Warfare, reveals how the propaganda machine of the Third Reich 
successfully put forth the idea that the people of Eastern Europe were 'Untermensch', 
subhurnan. This idea shaped the actions of the German army. In a moment that 
demonstrated this idea Herman Goering, commander of the Luftwaffe, stated 'jokingly': 
'...the cannibalism among Russian prisoners was now going a bit too far, they had eaten a 
German sentry.'(82) By reducing the Soviet prisoners to cannibalism they were trying to 
show the Untermensch nature of the Soviets. The influence of such ideals were best 
exemplified by Field Marshall Walter von Richenau, who said:
The essential goal of the campaign against the Jewish-Bolshevik system is the complete 
destruction of the sources of power and the eradication of the Asian influence on the 
European Cultural sphere ... The soldier in the East is not only a fighter by the rules of 
war but also the carrier of an inexorable racial concept and the avenger of all bestialities 
inflicted upon the Germans ... For this reason the soldier must have complete 
understanding for the necessity of harsh but just measures against Jewish sub-humanity ...
Only in this manner will we do justice to our historical task, to liberate the German 
people once and for all from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.(83)
There was significant evidence about this philosophy produced for the War Crimes Trial 
at Nuremberg. One witness, Eric Lahousen, of the Abwehr, spoke about a meeting he 
attended in which General Reinecke explained that the war against the Soviet Union was 
unlike any other, 'The Red Army soldier ... was not a soldier in the ordinary sense, but an 
ideological enemy.' National Socialism's enemy to the death and as such he had to be 
treated accordingly.(84) Therefore, the German soldier on the eastern front felt that he 
was fighting for the survival of the 'Fatherland', of his 'race'. The Soviets had lost their 
rights to humane treatment because they were racially and culturally inferior.
There was also Hitler's fear that the economic burden of caring for millions of prisoners 
would bring about unrest among the German people. This was especially true as the war 
progressed and the food situation worsened. The Reich did not believe that it was their 
business to feed the civilian population or prisoners.
... for the harsh punishment of Jewry ... The food situation at home makes it 
essential that the troops should be fed off the land, and that the largest 
possible stocks should be placed at the disposal of the homeland. In enemy 
cities a large part of the population will have to go hungry. Nothing, out of a 
misguided sense of humanity, may be given to prisoners of war or the 
population, unless they are in the service of the German Wehrmach.(85)
Millions of prisoners and civilians died as a result of this policy. By 1941 meat rations for 
German consumers were reduced by half. The official reason given for this drastic 
measure was that prisoners and foreign workers had to be fed.(86)
The war in the east was supposed to address the economic problems which an expanding 
Germany was facing. This concept was translated into the policy of Lebensraum, or 
'living space'. Its goal was to establish Germany as the leading power in Europe, and free 
it of all external dependencies. The main goal of Operation Barbarosa was not only the 
destruction of the Red Army but also the capture of Kiev, a fertile and economically rich 
region. Germany would secure food supplies from the Ukraine, also known as the 'bread 
basket', and guarantee the flow of oil and other raw materials from the Caucuses. This 
expansion would also allow for the resettlement of the growing 'Aryan' race.(87) Because 
of this policy the Polish and Soviets were seen as obstacles to be gotten rid of.
To the Soviets this was a war of survival as well as one of ideology. As the war 
progressed Soviet propaganda reached out to the patriotic Soviet citizen by emphasizing 
the defense of the 'Rodina', or Motherland, not the Communist state.(88) The difference 
between the Soviet treatment of prisoners and the German treatment of prisoners was that 
the suffering was not ordered from above. There were two orders: not to mistreat or to 
beat prisoners, and to release those incapable of work. As one German prisoner stated:
I was hit with a rifle butt twice and both times the offending soldier, when I 
complained, was released from guard duty ... The medical attention was 
excellent ... The system [of torture, and humiliation] that made the German 
camps into hell ... were not part of the Russian system. The cruelty of 
Stalinism was a bloodless cruelty. They wanted work from us, nothing but 
work.(89)
During the war there were two reasons for the use of prisoners as forced labor, a response 
to the needs of the war economy, and the influence of ideology and racism. Prisoners 
captured in the west were not subjected to the hard labor and living conditions which 
were imposed upon Soviet and Slavic prisoners. As Dziewanowski said: 'Human life was 
cheaper, the farther one went east.'(90)
When it came to dealing with prisoners of the Western Allies, it is believed that the 
Germans did their best. At the end of the war the House Committee on Military Affairs 
concluded that overall the Germans tried to observe the rules and regulations of the 
Geneva Convention. Whatever discrepancies there were came from a few camp 
commanders and the worsening food crisis. When it came to the campaigns in the west, 
for example France in 1940, the Wehrmact issued a series of orders to the effect that 
strict discipline be maintained among the prisoners, but at the same time not to harm or 
mistreat them. Logistical problems were foreseen, such as transportation and food, and 
rules were set down so as to 'avoid chaos and prevent unnecessary hardships.'(91)
This is not to say there were no atrocities committed against western prisoners. One 
example is the massacre at Malmedy which occurred on December 17, 1944. Hundreds 
of American prisoners were shot by troops of the 1st SS (Schutzstaffel) Panzer Division, 
It is important to remember two things about Malmedy; one, it was carried out by the SS, 
the fanatical wing of the Nazi Party, and two, the Germans were losing the war. On a 
separate occasion Adolf Hitler ordered, in 1942, that Allied commandos captured within 
the boundaries of the Third Reich, whether in uniform or not, be refused quarter.(92)
In many cases prisoners were housed in small and overpopulated camps. At one Stalag in 
Moosburg, there were over 110,000 Allied prisoners, of whom 11,000 were 
American.(93) The Germans had certain 'show' camps to impress the Red Cross and other 
relief societies, where the treatment of prisoners was appropriate and humane. The 
Stalags which were not open to inspection were well short of treating the prisoners within 
the guidelines of the Geneva Convention. In fact it was only the arrival of Red Cross 
packages that helped the prisoners survive.(94) The conditions experienced by the 
prisoners were often the best that could be provided by a country losing the war which 
had difficulties feeding its own soldiers and civilians.
The Americans, on the other hand, tried to give their German prisoners the best possible 
treatment. The argument for this was that the Germans might retaliate against American 
prisoners in their custody.(95) By taking such special care of German prisoners, the War 
Department wanted to assure that captured American soldiers would get the best possible 
treatment. To a certain extent this strategy worked in that Americans were always better 
off than the Polish or Soviets. Then again the Germans did not harbor the same racist 
feelings for the western prisoners that they did for the eastern prisoners. As more and 
more American prisoners returned, the conditions of their internment became public 
knowledge, and it was acknowledged by the War Department that there was a great 
difference in the level of treatment that the Germans received and the Americans 
received. The Assistant Provost Marshall, defending the difference in treatment, declared 
before Congress:
Yet, for us to treat with harshness the Germans in our hands would be to 
adopt the Nazi principle of hostages. The particular men held by us are not 
necessarily the ones who ill-treated our men in German prison camps. To 
punish one man for what another has done is not an American principle.(96)
When American forces invaded North Africa, they expected, and were prepared to take a 
fairly large number of prisoners, a total of 250,000. These prisoners faced hardships when 
they were transferred from camp to camp in the North African desert due to weather, and 
lack of shelter. But once they reached the United States they were accorded every 
privilege of the Geneva Convention.(97)
The prisoners were housed in Army barracks, fed, clothed, and entertained. Life in an 
American run camp in the US was much more pleasant than in any of the other camps 
kept by the Allies. The food provided was as good and sometimes better than what the 
civilians received. Diaries and memoirs of the German prisoners agree that food was 
excellent in quality and quantity. A standard lunch at Camp Clinton in Mississippi 
consisted of potato salad, roast pork, carrots, and ice water. They were provided with a 
canteen where they could buy additional foodstuffs, in some camps even beer or wine. 
They received adequate clothing, work clothes, which had a large white "PW' on the 
back, and personal items such as undergarments and coats. Team spoils and theatrical 
performances were organized by the prisoners.(98)
The Americans, like the Soviets, had a program for 're-education' and 'de-Nazification'. 
By March of 1943 the War Department drafted a plan in which: "Prisoners of war might 
be exposed to the facts of American history, the workings of democracy and the 
contributions made to America by people of all nations and origins." It was believed that 
exposure to political democracy would help the Germans see the error of Nazism. But the 
camps were controlled, through threats and physical violence, by a handful of hard-core 
Nazis and in order for the Americans to accomplish their policy they would have to 
segregate the camps. By removing the hard-core Nazis they could work with those that 
had a chance of changing.(99)
There were more and more violations of prisoners' rights by American forces as the war 
came to an end. On April 6, 1945 in the village of Tietelsen, Americans bitter with the 
loss of a hundred men, refused the appeal of an SS soldier for mercy. In a nearby forest 
thirteen German soldiers were found with bullet holes in the back of their heads. When 
American forces took Dachau, of the 560 German guards, 30 were killed in combat the 
rest shot afterwards, 346 being machine gunned under the orders of a lieutenant.(100) In 
May of 1945 there was a volatile mix in Germany, angry soldiers, who had witnessed the 
atrocities of the concentration camps, frustrated recruits, who did not get a chance to 
fight, and 'revenge seeking' Jewish officers. These factors accompanied by the 
overpopulated holding camps along the Rhine River led to unbearable conditions for the 
German prisoners on a massive scale.
In spite of the widespread breakdown of the treatment of prisoners there is no evidence 
that the mistreatment of German prisoners were part of a systematic and organized plan 
by the Allies as put forth by James Bacque in Other Losses. According to Bacque, the 
Allies, specifically Dwight Eisenhower, devised of a way to not meet their obligations to 
the Geneva Convention by reclassifying the prisoners as 'Displaced Enemy Forces'. This 
new 'classification' allowed Eisenhower to withhold adequate food rations and shelter. 
The result was underfed prisoners who were vulnerable to diseases which caused between 
800,000 and 1,000,000 deaths. This plan was supposedly carried out in the 'Death Camps' 
along the Rhine River.(101)
Bacque's assertions are refuted by many historians, including Gunter J. Bischoff's and 
Stephen E. Ambrose's Eisenhower and the German POW's. This book reveals that the 
'systematic' plan which Bacque proposes never existed. The number of German prisoners 
taken by American forces shot up from 313,000 to over 2.5 million in April of 1945.
With the collapse of the Ruhr pocket, Field Marshall Walter Model's Army Group B 
surrendered, adding 317,000 Germans to the already growing number of prisoners in 
American hands. There was an agreement between the United States and Great Britain 
whereby they would divide the prisoners fifty-fifty. But the British reneged for a variety 
of reasons; the effect of too many prisoners on the home island, not enough manpower to 
guard them, or space to allocate them. By June Ist Eisenhower reported that the number
of German prisoners was so high because of British refusal to accept anymore, that it 
began affecting the food stocks 'feeding all these unanticipated millions became a 
logistical nightmare.'
The United States was obligated, as a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929, to 
provide the German prisoners with rations equal to those of its own troops. The Supreme 
Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force did not have enough resources to feed all 
those prisoners and American soldiers, therefore the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General 
Eisenhower to change their designation to DEF's. The United States was not the only 
country to take such an action, Great Britain designated their prisoners 'SEF's'. This 
would allow them to feed the German prisoners at a lower level, but not starvation levels. 
The plan was to use German food supplies to feed the prisoners and whatever shortages 
appeared would be augmented by American food supplies. A reason for the shortage of 
supplies was that in the spring and summer of 1945 ships were being diverted to take 
assault troops and supplies to the Pacific, in preparation for the planned offensive against 
the home islands of Japan. Also it was difficult to transport supplies within Germany 
because its transportation network; railroad lines, bridges, and terminals, had been 
destroyed by Allied bombers. In the British zone of occupation of the 13,000 kilometers 
of railroad tracks only 1,000 were operable.(102)
The British can claim the best record when it comes to the treatment of prisoners which 
they held before the end of the war. The rations given to the prisoners were sometimes 
better than that of many British civilians. The one criticism they do receive is for the 
prisoner camps in Belgium. The mass surrender of the German armies toward the end of 
the war made it much more difficult to supply the prisoners with adequate housing, food, 
and clothing. These camps had an unusually high percentage of men over fifty and 
teenagers, ranging from 14 to 16. The mass surrenders also forced the British to reclassify 
some prisoners as 'SEF's' and to refuse to keep prisoners.(103)
The French, on the other hand, did not seem to care about the Geneva Conventions with 
regard to Germans. Resistance fighters within France were organized into the French 
Forces of the Interior (FFI), and formed part of the French army. In late 1944 the 
Germans executed 80 French civilian internees, and the FFI in response executed 80 
German prisoners.(104) Jean Pierre Pradervand, head of the International Red Cross, 
inspected a French camp that was 'like Buchenwald' in the sense that the prisoners were 
undernourished and dying at a rate of thirty per day. Once the conditions of the camps 
became known the United States, which turned over German prisoners to the French, 
ceased to do so. Another action taken by the United States was to deliver food and 
clothing to the Red Cross to distribute among the prisoners, not to the FFI. The 
mistreatment of prisoners also extended to the Italians captured in North Africa. Many 
were barefoot, 700 had died marching towards one of the camps, some being shot when 
they stopped for water.(105)
The experiences of the prisoner during the Second World War was dictated in large part 
by ideology and racism. This is evident in the practices by both Axis and Allied forces. 
There is a difference in that German, Japanese, French, and Soviet policies were ordered 
from above; while the illegal actions of American, British, and Australian soldiers came 
from individual decisions. As with the First World War and the convention of 1907 the 
Second World War clearly showed that the Convention of 1929 had many faults. The 
Convention, though with some exceptions, was in varying degrees applied in the Western 
European theater and North Aftica. But nonetheless the International Red Cross and the 
nations of the world once again revised the Convention. The result was the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 which expanded the obligations of the Detaining Power.
The Convention pertaining to prisoners was expanded to 143 articles compared to the 97 
articles of the 1929 Convention. But the second half of the twentieth century has been 
witness to armed conflicts, liberation struggles and revolutions, not declared wars. This is 
evident in the cases of Korea and Vietnam. Nonetheless, Article 2 states: '...the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise.'(106) Therefore, the rules and regulations pertaining to prisoners were in full 
effect during the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts.
The Convention is a code of legal rules designed to prevent the brutal and atrocious 
experiences of prisoners during the Second World War. An important concept of the 
Convention is that humane and decent treatment is a human right not a favor. The 
Convention is divided into six parts and each one deals with a distinct aspect of the 
prisoners rights and the Detaining Power's obligations. The first Parts, I and II, deal with 
the general provisions and rights of the prisoner. The most extensive is Part III, Articles 
17-108, which deals with the life of a prisoner while in captivity. The most disputed 
article from this part is Article 85 which deals with the restrictions of the Convention if a 
prisoner is found to be a war criminal. The interpretation of this article by the North 
Vietnamese during the conflict would be of major concern to the United States. Part IV 
titled 'Termination of Captivity' deals with the repatriation of the prisoners at the end of 
hostilities and this section would be the one which would lead the conflict in Korea to 
extend for another two years. Part V relates to the information bureaus and the Relief 
Societies, while Part VI grants the Protecting Power the ability to inspect the places of 
internment in order to ensure that the Detaining Power is adhering to the 
Convention.(107)
During the Korean conflict the issue which stalled the armistice was repatriation. In 
general the prisoners are victims of circumstance and the principle task of the Detaining 
Power is to ensure that the prisoners are in good physical and mental condition at the end 
of hostilities for repatriation. Article 118 of the Convention called for the immediate 
repatriation of all prisoners at the end of hostilities. This was originally intended as a 
weapon, by the United States, against the Soviet Union which held large number of Axis 
prisoners as forced labor after the end of the Second World War.(108) The Convention 
assumed that all prisoners would wish to return to their homeland but the Korean conflict 
was one in which the allegiance of the prisoners, especially Chinese and North Korean, 
would fluctuate between communism, capitalism, and nationalism. This article would 
come to dominate the question of prisoners of war during the conflict as its interpretation 
from both sides differed.
After the Second World War there was a polarization of the victorious Allies along 
ideological lines. The 'Cold War', as it became known, was a reflection of the political 
differences between the forces of 'Capitalism' and 'Communism'. The Korean Conflict 
was the first battleground for these ideals. Both sides regarded the prisoners as tools in 
the ideological struggle as 'the Chinese tried to convert UN personnel along the Yalu, the 
US attempted to demonstrate the bankruptcy of communism.' The prisoner of war issue 
was bound with national prestige and ideology and was so important during the conflict 
that it singlehandedly almost destroyed the prospects for an armistice.
Yet, none of the participants of the conflict were signatories of the Geneva Convention of 
1949, as they all came to sign the Convention years later, but they, the United States, 
South Korea, China, and North Korea, announced at the outset of the conflict that 
prisoner of war policy would be based on the Geneva rules.(109) Because of Article 85 
the repatriation of prisoners became a major obstacle to the armistice. The question which 
arose in Korea is whether or not the prisoner must be repatriated against his will.
The deaths of most UN personnel were concentrated in the first year of hostilities when 
,mistreatment, disease, cold, and food scarcity made conditions submarginal for sustained 
life.' These were not just problems affecting the prisoners but also the soldiers on the 
front. A feature of this conflict was that an overwhelming number of the prisoners were 
taken in the first year. During the North Korean offensive, June to mid-September 1950, 
the prisoners were treated well, with adequate food and first aid for the sick and the 
wounded. Most of the prisoners were transported by train from Seoul to Pyongyang.(110) 
But in some cases prisoners were often shot, especially if wounded, and were marched 
north to be held in overcrowded jails and requisitioned schools.
Improved treatment coincided with the attempts of the North Koreans to exploit the 
prisoners for propaganda purposes. This improvement was evident in the food supplied to 
the prisoners. American prisoners in North Korea were fed on a diet of bread, rice, dried 
fish, fruit, and sometimes meat. The propaganda methods ranged from radio 
announcements denouncing American involvement to written statements in support of the 
North Korean cause by prisoners. But these efforts were cut short with the landing of UN 
forces at Inchon. During the time when North Korean forces were beaten back the 
mistreatment of prisoners increased and the first of the 'Death Marches' took place.
Many atrocities occurred as the American advance pushed the Communist forces out of 
South Korea. The prisoners, often without boots and clad in summer uniforms, were 
marched north toward temporary camps. This occurred in the month of November when 
the weather conditions began to worsen. An official Army War Crimes report states: 
"most fatalities resulted from marches to camps..." General Philip Deane, captured after 
the fall of Taejon, witnessed the brutality of Major 'Tiger' Kim of the Security Police:
We heard many shots. At one point in the serpentine winds of the road, 
stopping because of dysentery, I looked down to the lower bend. The Tiger 
was pushing one of the dying with his foot into the ditch. When the GI was 
completely off the road, the Tiger shot him. I saw two more killed in this 
way...before the guard kicked me on.
The "Sunchon Tunnel Massacre" was another one of these incidents. A group of 
prisoners from Pyongyang were being evacuated by train. On October 20, 1950 the train 
halted in a tunnel near Sunchon and the prisoners were taken off in groups and machine-
gunned.(111)
When China entered the conflict the tide turned against the United Nations forces and 
many more prisoners were taken. Upon their capture the prisoners were usually stripped 
of their clothing and the sick and wounded went untreated. Prisoners were forced to live 
outside as Chinese troops occupied their quarters and as the weather turned cold the 
prisoners, still clad in summer uniforms, began to suffer from exposure. Some were 
housed in mud huts that were so overcrowded they hardly had room to lie down. Millet 
replaced rice as food rations were cut. Because of these conditions 'Malnutrition, 
dysentery, pneumonia, louse infestation, frostbite, and neglected battle wounds took 
heavy tolls.' The prisoners were interned at temporary camps where they were once again 
recruited for propaganda purposes.'(112)
With the establishment of the permanent camps along the Yalu River the prisoners were 
once again subjected to a long and harsh joumey. The policy regarding prisoners were 
laid down by China and it was in direct contrast to the North Korean policy. The North 
Koreans never had a coherent policy regarding prisoners and it was made worse by the 
turn of events that swung the conflict from near victory to total defeat. Due to this there 
were no preparations to hold the prisoners and their exploitation was haphazard. The 
Chinese had established a policy, with regards to prisoners, during the civil war and the 
Second World War which they would implement in the Korean conflict. This was a two 
fold policy, the 'lenient policy' and the 'long-term policy'. With the 'lenient policy' 
prisoners were given food, medical treatment, and were not to be robbed or abused. This 
was accompanied by a political speech before being released. A group of Americans 
were: 'inspected by a Chinese officer who gave them cigarettes, a good meal of chicken, 
and told them they could rejoin their own forces.' The lenient policy was not always 
applied as their decision to intervene was a sudden one and they were not yet prepared to 
house and feed the prisoners. This policy was abandoned with the UN's spring 
offensive.(113)
The Chinese decided to implement their 'long-term policy' and held the prisoners in the 
permanent camps along the Yalu. Once the truce talks began there was some 
improvement in the treatment of prisoners. The food and medical care provided were not 
the best but they were sufficient enough where they were not a threat to the lives of a 
prisoner.(114) Under these conditions the prisoners were forced to participate in an 
intense 're-education' program. They were to be 'reeducated' by showing them that they 
were pawns of the 'ruling class' and the true nature of their societies and the war. The 
methods of this program became known as 'brainwashing' though it did not use drugs or 
hypnosis but 'psychological pressure and calculated brutality ... within a totally controlled 
environment.' But 'brainwashing', according to an official U.S. Army report, is 'designed 
to erase an individual's past beliefs and concepts and substitute new ones.' The report 
went on to state, 'In Korea, American prisoners of war were subjected to group 
indoctrination, not 'brainwashing'. (115)
In order for successful indoctrination the Chinese had to create a total environment in 
which the prisoner was dependent on them. This started with the removal of officers, 
NCO's and 'reactionaries' from the camps. The 'reactionaries' were segregated and 
forfeited their right to 'lenient treatment', while 'progressives' were given special 
privileges and promoted to key positions in the camps. In order to foster distrust among 
the prisoners informing on one another was encouraged. They also played upon the racial 
and ethnic differences among the prisoners by segregating African-Americans, Puerto 
Ricans, and Filipinos.(116) Non-American prisoners were also used to try and exploit the 
tensions between the US and its Allies.
The program extended from education to leisure and recreation and was based on 
reward/punishment. The educational aspect of the program consisted of discussions 
usually lasting six to eight hours but sometimes longer in which the Chinese explained 
communism, capitalism, and the origins of the war. At the same time the prisoners were 
encouraged to confess past errors and to criticize the social and economic organization of 
their countries. During leisure and recreation periods the camp loudspeakers were tuned 
to the English language service of Radio Beijing, and were shown Soviet propaganda 
films. They also manipulated the mail in order to make the prisoners feel isolated, and 
denied the International Red Cross access to the camps until shortly before the truce. The 
object of this program was 'to transform the prisoners into a force which would "fight for 
peace" within their own societies upon release.'(117)
The efforts of this program resulted in twenty-two Americans and one Scot refusing 
repatriation. The "22 Who Stayed" led many Americans to question the strength of 
American prisoners to communist indoctrination and to the spirit of the soldier in general. 
It is important to realize that collaboration with the enemy was never as serious as some 
believed. For the prisoners writing letters home in support of the Chinese and signing 
petitions were the only way to let people know that they were still alive. The majority of 
prisoners were guilty of such collaboration without ever truly becoming 'progressives'. 
This attitude "that seemed to represent a vulnerability with respect to superficial 
compromises with their captor in the long run was a fundamental armament."(118) It was 
their desire to survive that led the prisoners to choose this path during their internment.
In order to ensure that North Korean prisoners would be treated according to the Geneva 
Convention the US Army assumed control of prisoners in September 1950. As always the 
US wanted to prevent reprisals against captured UN personnel, particularly since South 
Korean soldiers had 'a tendency to mistreat or kill prisoners of war at the slightest 
provocation'(119) Because of the rapid advance of UN forces it was believed that the 
conflict would shortly be over. Therefore prisoners were housed in temporary camps. 
These camps were mostly located in Pusan, Pyongyang, and Inchon. Despite the desire of 
the US Army to follow the guidelines of the Convention the conditions in the camp were 
poor as they lacked the resources to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical 
care. With the intervention of China in November of 1950 the Eighth Army hastily 
evacuated the advance camps as they retreated. The population of the Pusan camp 
increased from 63,000 at the end of October to 135,000 by the end of December.(120)
At this point it was realized that the conflict would last longer than predicted and 
preparations had to be made for the maintenance of the prisoners. Because Pusan was the 
UN's principal port for supplies and personnel the presence of hundreds of thousands of 
prisoners and tens of thousands of refugees created a security problem. In February 1951 
Operation Albany was executed. This was the evacuation of prisoners from Pusan to the 
island of Koje-Do. The prisoners faced many hardships on this voyage:
If any camera man had filmed what happened during this voyage ... even 
Satan would be indignant at seeing it ... When two-thirds of the POW's [had 
been] put in the ship, the room of the ship was jammed with people. GI 
guards pushed them ... [further in], but they found it of no use and they 
stabbed the men around them with jackknives.(121)
With the establishment of the camps at Koje food and rations improved even though life 
as a prisoner remained unpleasant. By May 1951 Koje was accepting 2,000 new prisoners 
every day. Most of them Chinese captured during the spring offensive. By the end of 
June 1951 there were over 146,000 prisoners on Koje.
The one problem which carried over from the camps at Pusan was the shortage of 
manpower, and this shortage was quantitative as well as qualitative. The ratio of 
prisoners to American guards was 188 to 1 and if the South Korean guards were included 
than the ratio dropped to 33 to 1. But this was still above the recommended 20 to 1 ratio. 
On the whole living conditions were much improved and in some cases the prisoners 
were better off than the South Korean guards.(122)
A re-education program entitled Civil Information and Education (CIE) had been 
introduced in the temporary camps of Pusan in 1950. Five hundred North Korean 
prisoners were selected to participate in the pilot program which was a mixture of lessons 
learned during the 'de-Nazification' of Germany and 're-education' of Japan. The plan 
collapsed as UN forces retreated and the prisoners were evacuated to Koje. CIE was 
introduced to the prisoners on Koje in April 1951 and was designed: "to develop ... an 
understanding and appreciation of the political, social, and economic objectives of the 
United Nations and to assist [the prisoners] in various other ways so that they may 
become better citizens in their country."(123) The program was combined with literacy 
and vocational training, which communist prisoners would participate in, but boycott the 
orientation lectures. The program led to violent confrontations between the Communist 
and anti-Communist prisoners when the issue of repatriation arose. It is important to note 
that the program was not intended to persuade the prisoners to refuse repatriation but to 
return to their countries with these new ideals.
The prisoner had divided themselves into two factions, Communist and anti-Communist, 
when they arrived at Pusan. The first members were leaders or potential leaders and were 
familiar with organizational tactics. The Communist faction was more formally organized 
as the core of party members had been 'schooled in the use and techniques of 
organization as a weapon of control.' For this reason the anti-Communists usually 
patterned their organization on that of the Communists. In the anti-communist Chinese 
camps the leaders were ex-Guomindong soldiers drafted into the PLA after 1949. They 
were aided by the presence of Guornindong staff officers brought from Taiwan to help in 
the CIE program. This reinforced the anti-communist's reftisal of repatriation. These 
factions would retain their control over the prisoners when they were transferred to Koje-
Do.
What became the most important aspect of a prisoners camp life was his political 
allegiance as it became a struggle between communism and democracy. This struggle 
was accentuated by the lack of manpower because camp administrators came to rely 
heavily upon the prisoners and their leaders for the distribution of supplies and 
maintenance of discipline. Once a faction had control of a camp they would place their 
members, with the consent of camp administrators, in positions of authority, especially in 
the police force. They would use this police force to disrupt and antagonize other factions 
through beatings, incarceration, and murder. This allowed the political leaders to control 
the prisoners not only through the manipulation of supplies but also through physical 
violence and terror.(124)
The resistance of the anti-communists made it very difficult to end the conflict. On the 
one hand there was Washington's refusal to force repatriation, coupled with fear that if 
the prisoners were not returned there would be reprisals against UN captives. How to 
protect both the UN prisoners and the repatriated prisoners? Both Truman and Acheson 
cited the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens at the end of the Second World War, many 
of whom committed suicide on the transport trains, were murdered or sent to labor 
camps, as a reason why not to forcefully repatriate the prisoners.(125)
This issue was a source of friction for the United States and its allies. Great Britain and 
Australia accepted that there was an element of genuine humanitarianism in US policy, 
but ideological considerations and propaganda were involved as well. The US wanted to 
claim a moral and ideological victory over the Communists perhaps because the conflict 
had come to a draw. Both Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden believed that 
the fate of the prisoners was a question of 'honor and humanity'. They had no wish to let 
the war drag on, especially "at the expense of additional suffering to British and 
Commonwealth prisoners," but they too recalled the fate of repatriated Soviet citizens 
from the Second World War. Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies criticized 
Washington's policy saying; 'if the allied choice lay simply between the continuation of 
the war and acceptance of forcible repatriation ... I would have no hesitation in choosing 
the latter.'(126) Nonetheless Great Britain and Australia supported US policy.
The end of the conflict depended upon communist agreement to voluntary repatriation, 
which was rejected at Panrnunjorn in January, 1952. A solution to this impasse was the 
screening of the prisoner into two groups, 'repatriates' and 'non-repatriates'. It was hoped
this would be acceptable to the North Koreans, but only if there was a large number of 
repatriates. The communist prisoner factions controlling the camps exerted their power 
over the mass of prisoners, demonstrating and rioting to avoid screening. The UN 
commanders, lacking manpower, avoided screening these camps. The anti-Communists 
used violence to convince a majority of prisoners to refuse repatriation; those who 
wanted repatriation were 'either beaten black and blue or killed.'(127) A total of 70,000 
prisoners demanded repatriation 75,000, refused. This number was unacceptable to the 
communists, making screening more of a problem than a solution.
The armistice talks reached a deadlock until Resolution 610, by the UN General 
Assembly in 1953, which stated 'force shall not be used against prisoners of war to 
prevent or effect their return to their homelands. After further negotiations both parties 
agreed on the principle of voluntary repatriation. Article 51 (a) of the Armistice ordered 
the release of "all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the 
side to which they belonged at the time of capture."(128)
Ideological and national interests were put before the well-being of the prisoners. Both in 
the propaganda battle between the US and the Communists and in the negotiations that 
followed, the issue of prisoners was of key importance. This is especially true of the UN 
prisoners who remained . in enemy hands longer due to the policies of the US, ultimately 
they were sacrificed in the name of 'democracy'. Former American prisoners were 
scrutinized for collaboration becoming the scapegoat for the nation's failure to win in 
Korea. It led to "...propaganda by Americans, about Americans, directed to Americans. 
The theme of this propaganda was that there had been wholesale collaboration by the 
American prisoners with their Communist captors..." The 'weakness' of the American 
prisoners was seen as a weakness in the social fabric of the US and they were accused of 
collaboration when they returned during the 'McCarthy Era'. Further those Korean and 
Chinese prisoners who refused repatriation were seen as heroes in the ideological struggle 
for 'the minds of men.(129) Of the thousands of 'Communist' prisoners who refused 
repatriation, the quality and the opportunity of the capitalist way of life gave reality or 
meaning to 'democracy'.
Vietnam involved a new method of warfare, guerrilla warfare, and US military 
commanders believed that American forces, with their superior mobility and firepower, 
could easily destroy the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The confidence in 
American technology and industrial strength led the military commanders to 
underestimate the ability and commitment of the communist soldier, due in part to their
lack of weapons and training. On the other hand American soldiers could rely on the 
latest equipment to help in destroying the enemy. General William Westmoreland, head 
of Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, planned his strategy of 'search and destroy' 
around the 'superior mobility and firepower' of the US in order to 'bleed' the communist 
forces. It failed because Communist forces were willing to accept a high rate of casualties 
in exchange for victory.(130)
American soldiers, trained to fight a conventional war against Communist forces in 
Europe, would find themselves in the unconventional world of rice paddies and jungles 
where technology would not have the impact it had in previous wars. Another 
complication to Westmoreland's 'search and destroy' strategy was the inability to 
distinguish between combatant and non-combatant . "...the enemy soldier clad in black 
pajamas and a cookie hat, wraps his weapon in oil cloth, buries it in a rice paddy during 
the day and becomes a soldier only at night."(131)
It should be noted that the ranks of the Vietcong were made up of armed farmers 
including women and children, who could strike in the jungle or the streets of Saigon. 
This led to atrocities on behalf of American and South Vietnamese forces who could not 
tell the difference between the two. The incident at My Lai, in which American soldiers 
massacred a hundred Vietnamese peasants, women, children, and old men among them, 
was due in part because the inhabitants were alleged to have concealed their weapons. 
The entitlement to prisoner of war status is that the person "carry arms openly and respect 
the laws and customs of war," by 'hiding' the weapons they had violated these laws and 
customs of war.(132)
US combat forces in Vietnam began to take prisoners but the denial of prisoner of war 
status to the Vietcong was to haunt American prisoners in the hands of the Vietcong. 
Since the Vietcong were considered insurgents they were turned over to the South 
Vietnamese for detention.
... An American unit will move into a village, or an area, and round up every 
male. A South Vietnamese liaison officer will then interrogate each man, 
and if he believes that the man is a Vietcong guerrilla or even a sympathizer, 
the man will be taken off to a detainment camp. After detailed interrogation, 
he is usually executed.(133)
The transfer of prisoners to the South Vietnamese by American forces is contrary to the 
provisions of the Convention because of the deplorable treatment they receive. Before 
persons entitled to prisoner of war status are handed over to South Vietnamese forces the 
US must assure the former's willingness and ability to treat them as prescribed in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949; article 12 of the Convention states:
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power 
which is party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied 
itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the 
Convention... Nevertheless, if that power fails to carry out the provisions of 
the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners 
of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, 
take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of 
the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.(134)
Therefore the US is responsible for the well-being of the prisoners that they have turned 
over, in this manner, among others, they failed in adhering to the Geneva Conventions. 
The inability of the US to safeguard the rights of Vietcong prisoners resulted in reprisals 
against American prisoners. On June 25, 1966 Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Front 
Radio announced that an American soldier, Sgt. Harold G. Bennet, held as a prisoner by 
the Vietcong had been executed in reprisal for the execution of a Vietcong guerrilla by 
the South Vietnamese. (135)
In order to be successful in guerilla warfare the interrogation of guerrillas, and the 
civilians suspected of helping them, is an important key to winning the conflict. But in 
many instances the interrogation of prisoners degenerated into brutal torture. The use of 
torture was clearly prohibited by international law but was widely practiced by both sides 
in Vietnam. As early as 1964, in the presence of US military advisors, South Vietnamese 
soldiers were torturing and executing prisoners.
The favorite methods of torture used by Government troops are to slowly 
beat a captive, drag him behind a moving vehicle, apply electrodes to 
sensitive parts of his body or block his mouth, while water spiced with hot 
pepper is poured down his nostrils.
The Vietcong have treated captured government soldiers or officials with 
equal brutality. There have been innumerable cases of Government soldiers 
and officials who have been crucified, burned alive, horrible mutilated in 
torture, beheaded, disemboweled or simply shot.(136)
There is also evidence of Americans beheading and shooting wounded prisoners, and 
pushing them out of helicopters. The soldiers responsible told their superiors that the 
prisoners were killed while attempting to escape. There was also the case of an American 
Lieutenant wiring a field telephone generator to the genitals of a prisoner and 
administering electric shocks. (137)
At the outset of the war the North Vietnamese government informed the Swiss 
government of its intentions to abide by the Geneva Conventions of 1949. One point 
which the North Vietnamese would object to was Article 85; 'Prisoners of war prosecuted 
under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, 
even if convicted, the benefits of the present convention.' The communique from the 
North Vietnamese government included a reservation to this article:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that prisoners of war 
prosecuted and convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in 
accordance with the principles laid down by Nuremberg Court of Justice 
shall not benefit from the present Convention, as specified in Article 
85.'(138)
The North Vietnamese referred to captured American pilots as "war criminals" for 
bombing the cities of North Vietnam, therefore, they were not entitled to the protection of 
the Convention.
There is a difference among the American prisoners of war held by the Vietcong and the 
North Vietnamese. This distinction is made mainly because of their place of internment. 
Those held by the Vietcong are known as 'Jungle POW's' and were constantly on the 
move so as to avoid ground and air attacks. Those held by the North Vietnamese were 
known as the 'Hanoi POW's' because a majority were held in Hao Lo prison, also known 
as the 'Hanoi Hilton'. Conditions for both types of prisoners were primitive. At the Hanoi 
Hilton the prisoners were locked up in filthy cells, and the malnourished prisoners 
suffered from dysentery, fevers, and chronic skin infections. After 1969, when the Paris 
peace talks got under way, the internment conditions of prisoners in North Vietnam 
improved. The diet was improved as sweetened milk and pieces of meat were added. The 
jungle camps were worse because the prisoners were at the end of the enemy supply 
distribution chain which forced them to supplement their diet of rice and manioc, with 
plants and rats. Many died from sicknesses due to malnutrition.(139)
At the 'Hanoi Hilton' the majority of prisoners were subjected to psychological and 
physical torture. Often isolation, from the world and one another, was in itself a form of 
torture. Men were beaten and in many cases their wrists and elbows were firmly bound 
behind their back with rope that was then pulled upward until his arms were raised and 
his head was forced downward between his shackled legs. This forin of torture often 
resulted in dislocated arms and legs, and nerve damage which could last for months or 
years. The Jungle POW's suffered less torture than their counterparts in the north but they 
were frequently placed in bamboo huts, also known as 'tiger-cages', and placed in leg 
irons or chains.(140)
From the moment of capture the prisoners were used for a propaganda campaign that was 
waged for both international and domestic public opinion. On July 6, 1966, in preparation 
for their trial, American prisoners were 'paraded through the crowd lined streets of 
Hanoi.' The prisoners were forced to write letters of amnesty to Ho Chi Minh, sign 
statements of apology to the Vietnamese people, and tape record messages denouncing 
the war. Non-cooperation lead to collective punishment by reducing the amount of food 
and care. Individual punishment was in the form of solitary confinement in pits or other 
small, cramped spaces.(141)
The Paris Agreement had two short range goals, the return of American prisoners and the 
simultaneous withdrawal of US combat forces by the end of March 1973. The Prisoner of 
War Subcommission was to handle all matters concerning both American and 
Vietnamese prisoners. The American delegation requested information including the 
numbers to be released, places of detention, and places of release. They also wanted to 
secure information on personnel not included on the published lists, including death 
certificates to help account for the missing and provide for the return of their remains. 
The repatriation of prisoners went along with few problems and the last group of 
Americans were returned by early April.(142) There remains many questions about the 
men which are unaccounted for in Vietnam. There is no way to tell if those 'Missing in 
Action' were prisoners of war or not and this study concerns itself with the experiences of 
the prisoner of war. So like the men their story remains a mystery.
The repatriation procedures for American prisoners was called 'Operation Homecoming.' 
They were to be flown to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. Once there they 
received extensive medical attention and were given the opportunity to telephone their 
next of kin. The former prisoners were treated like heroes receiving promotions, back 
pay, and parades upon their arrival to the US. This is in contrast to the repatriation 
procedures of 'Big Switch' from Korea when foriner prisoners were received with 
suspicion and skepticism. The US Army wanted to avoid the attack on returning soldiers 
which the Korean prisoners encountered in the 1950's.(143)
The prisoner of war in the twentieth century is a victim of circumstance whose treatment, 
at any given time, has been affected by many factors. Amidst the chaos of war the 
humanitarian principles of the Geneva and Hague Conventions have tried to regulate the 
treatment of prisoners. The experiences of the prisoner of war can be divided into two 
phases during this century, the first phase can be attributed to a lack of understanding of 
modem warfare; the second the ideological differences between belligerents.
In the First World War the mistreatment of prisoners was not a systematic policy, it came 
about because of the underestimation of warfare. New weapons, the commitment 
necessary from the civilian population, mass armies and the tremendous amount of 
logistical support to sustain both the civilian populace and the military revolutionized 
warfare. The mobilization of millions of men meant that millions of prisoners would be 
taken and the logistical capabilities of the belligerents were not sufficient to care for the 
extraordinary amount of prisoners.
In the Second World War we see that the treatment of prisoners is much harsher than the 
cases cited for the First World War. The Second World War shows us that in some areas 
it is possible to set up a logistical base that can meet the needs of the prisoners, the 
United States, Great Britain, and to some extent Germany did so. But at some point in 
time the number of prisoners overwhelms the capabilities of the detaining power to fulfill 
the Geneva Conventions. In some cases, like Tietelsen, the massacre of prisoners was a 
form of reprisals and it occurred in the heat of battle. During the Second World War the 
massacre of prisoners was justified by ideology, the bushido in Japan, Weltanschauungen
in Germany, and ethnic and ideological hatreds among the Allies. As Gerhard Weinberg 
wrote:
The subject has only recently begun to draw serious attention, but there had 
clearly been a distinctive break in the military traditions of both Germany 
and Japan. Armies which had conducted themselves on the whole rather 
honorably before [in prior wars] ... acted fundamentally different in World 
War Two.(144)
The evidence indicates that the policies of the belligerents was very different from those 
in place during the First World War. This shows the extent to which the ideological 
differences and the militarism of the period influenced the treatment of prisoners of war.
The latter half of the twentieth century saw the division of the world into two armed 
camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Korean conflict the 
prisoner of war became a pawn in the 'Cold War'. The belligerents were interested in 
winning the allegiance of the prisoners, therefore treatment was based upon the prisoner's 
willingness to conform to the wishes of the Detaining Power or the prisoner faction. In 
the Second World War and Korea, the treatment of prisoners was on the whole much 
better than it was to prove in Vietnam. Those conflicts were conventional in nature 
involving nation states which recognized the Geneva Conventions.
In Vietnam ideology and revolutionary insurgency would influence the way prisoners 
were treated. The difficulty in distinguishing combatants from non-combatants during 
Vietnam led to many atrocities. The inability of the US to adapt to guerilla warfare and 
their underestimation of the Vietcong led to the mistreatment of prisoners of war. The 
Vietcong policy on prisoners of war was reactionary as they murdered American 
prisoners in response to the execution of Vietcong personnel.
It is difficult to write a conclusion which answers those questions which I asked myself 
as a boy. The history of the prisoner of war in the twentieth century has been pessimistic 
with few bright spots, the Geneva and Hague Conventions being two of them. The 
conventions have been successful in learning from the experiences of these men, and 
applying what has been learned. Nevertheless the evidence proves that the willingness 
and ability of the belligerents to provide for the prisoner of war is crucial if atrocities and 
abuses are to be avoided. Many nations have proven that the ability to provide adequate 
care and treatment for the prisoner of war exists, the question now becomes: Is the state 
willing to provide adequate care and treatment for the prisoner of war? The answer to this 
question can be attributed to ideology, nationalism, and racism, particularly in the last 
half of the century, and its infringement upon the rights of the prisoners which are 
guaranteed by international legislation. Though cooperation of states depends on their 
view of the enemy, whether foreign troops or revolutionary rebellious citizens, as long as 
ideological, national, and racial hatreds dominate the treatment of prisoners of war this 
cycle of human suffering will continue.
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